## AC

**Plan**: The United States federal government should create a Reparations Superfund.

**Berry 14** clarifies[[1]](#footnote-1)

Beyond reparations to individuals, **there should be a “Reparations Superfund”** as historian V.P. Franklin suggests. **Monies could come from institutions and corporations that profited from slave labor; additional funds could come from banks and insurance companies** that had been **guilty of** racial discriminatory practices, such as **redlining and predatory** financial **lending**. The fund, administered by a federal agency, would ideally have an independent oversight board composed of African-American representatives whose responsibility would be to identify promising programs and projects. **Community groups** and other nonprofit organizations **serving slave-descendant African-Americans could apply for funds to address housing, health, education, employment, entrepreneurship and other needs as their members determine.** The reparations debate arises whenever conventional civil rights remedies are imperiled. If we are serious this time around, we should support enactment of Congressman John Conyers’ bill for a federal reparations commission to study the issue.

**Advantage 1** is Soft Power

Reparations for Black Americans will set an international precedent and bolster US legitimacy – Japanese American reparations prove

**Yamamoto et al 3** writes[[2]](#footnote-2)

**In the late** 19**80s, as the U**nited **S**tates **intensified its war on communism and** the injustices of communist regimes49 and as **Japanese Americans were partly recharacterized as patriots**,50 the Reagan administration shifted political gears. Reparations to repair the harm of American injustice became a moral issue - the right thing to do - with international political consequences. Subsequently, **Congress passed** and President Reagan signed **the Civil Liberties Act** of 1988, **authorizing** $1.2 billion in **reparations**, a presidential apology, and a public education campaign.51 The apology and reparations were cathartic for many. Most important, for the government, political and constitutional history were rewritten. **The U**nited **S**tates **sent a**n explicit **message to the world that Congress, the President, and** the **courts will - if compelled - redress historic** government **injustice**. It also sent an implicit message that the United States stands on a "high moral plane" in the deciding moments of its war on communism. Indeed, **Japanese American reparations are now regularly cited domestically and internationally as precedent for governments to act morally by redressing their own gross** civil and **human rights violations**.52 Viewed in this light, the Korematsu coram nobis litigation was the retrial of an epochal race case with transformative consequences. Yet, while apt in some respects, this characterization is also significantly overstated. **The Korematsu story remains "unfinished business."**53 As Professor Jerry Kang observes, the coram nobis decisions did not directly criticize, and therefore publicize, the judiciary's complicity in the internment debacle.54 In effect, looking back, the coram nobis opinions gave the Supreme Court a free pass despite its apparent duplicity during World War II. The high Court then had asserted that it was strictly scrutinizing the racial internment while doing the exact opposite - deferring, instead, to the government's unsubstantiated (and at least in part deliberately falsified) claim of military necessity.55 The Court had also maintained that the internment was not about racism against a vulnerable minority, despite ample evidence to the contrary and Justice Murphy's stinging dissent in Korematsu characterizing the Court's decision as a descent "into the ugly abyss of racism."56 The retrial of Korematsu is unfinished business for another reason. Since the horrific killing of 2,300 Americans and people from countries around the world on September 11th, the old national security and civil liberties tension has reemerged at the juncture of race and religion.57 Indeed, some in government are resurrecting "old Korematsu" to justify contemplated wholesale curtailment of American civil liberties.5 For instance, Peter Kirsanow, a controversial Bush appointee to the Commission on Civil Rights, predicted the broad-scale internment of Arab Americans if another terrorist attack occurs in the United States. He drew upon the original, now discredited, Korematsu case as legal precedent for incarcerating a racial group in the name of national security. He failed to mention that the later coram nobis cases found that the government had falsified the military-necessity basis for the internment in order to justify it in the courts and that the internment and its "legalization" had resulted in a manifest injustice warranting reparations.59 Even more disturbing, U.S. Representative Howard Coble, head of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, said on a radio show that he agreed with the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II. Coble cited "national security" as the justification for the indefinite incarceration of innocent American citizens on the basis of their race because "some probably were intent on doing harm to us" - the very rationale refuted by the coram nobis cases. He also intimated that the same rationale would apply today to the mass detention of Arab Americans because "some of these Arab-Americans are probably intent on doing harm to us [too]."60 Of specific concern, one of two United States citizens of color branded "enemy combatants," Brooklyn-born Jose Padilla, has been held indefinitely in solitary confinement in a military detention camp, without charges or access to counsel.61T he Department of Justice first proclaimed that Padilla had to be incarcerated without civil liberties protections because he was a threat to national security - he was part of an al Qaeda scheme to detonate a radiological bomb in the United States.62 Later, the Bush administration determined that it would no longer hold him as a criminal to be tried but would detain him indefinitely as a potential witness.63N onetheless, the government continued to detain Padilla without full access to counsel and sought to prevent him from challenging in court his "enemy combatant" designation.64 The danger of giving the government carte blanche under the mantle of national security is further underscored by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's recent excoriation of the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") for lying to the courts to obtain national security wiretaps and electronic surveillance.65 Largely because of the persistent deception and the potential for misuse of intelligence information in criminal cases, the Surveillance Court refused the Justice Department's demand for broad new powers under the USA PATRIOT Act.66 Nevertheless, despite concerns of potential abuse of power, a special appellate panel of the Foreign Intelligence Court of Review in Washington validated the Justice Department's broad surveillance powers under the Act.67 Kirsanow's prediction of a possible new racial internment, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's strident criticism of the FBI for frequently lying to the court about national security, and civil liberties organizations' challenges to the Justice Department's racial profiling and indefinite and unexplained national security detention of individuals, collectively, signal an attempted replaying of "old Korematsu." This apparent resurrection itself reveals that **crucial issues of** American **racial justice are on trial - again**. Key cases in constitutional history stand for far more than the specifics of the cases themselves. In their domestic and international political context, how these cases are framed, publicized, and decided puts the United States' very conception of racial justice on trial.68 Korematsu, with its initial branding of Asian Americans as disloyal foreigners and its later coram nobis "liberation" of Japanese Americans, is such a case. As was **Dred Scott** v. Sandford69( bolstering the slave economy by determining that African Americans were not citizens), **Plessy v. Ferguson**70 (announcing the separate-but-equal doctrine to legitimate Jim Crow segregation), **Brown v. Board** of Education71 (overruling Plessy and ending overt governmental racial discrimination), **and the Rodney King** police **trials**72 (sparking an uprising and riots in the face of perceived continuing institutionalized racial injustice).73 Each of these cases, and the public trials that shaped them, were epochal racialized events.74 In some respects they introduced new issues and ideas to the American public. In other respects they replayed the same racial themes in new settings. For good or ill, they **informed** how **the American public and the world** at the time came to view American racial justice under the law. **And** in turn they **influenced**, and were influenced by, **the moral standing of the U**nited **S**tates **in international** political **affairs**.75 Now, **in addition to revisiting Korematsu, the U**nited **S**tates **faces a second epochal race "re-trial"** - one likely to traverse the national consciousness for years. B. Retrying African American Reparations Claims - An Overview This epochal event for the American polity is **marked** collectively **by** ten **recently filed**76 and at least one forthcoming **African American** wild **reparation suits**77 and suits in American courts on behalf of South African apartheid victims.78A frican American racial justice is on trial - again.

The movement for black American reparations has international significance

**Yamamoto et al 3** writes[[3]](#footnote-3)

**The present-day African American reparations movement** builds on this history of racial terror and ensuing segregation and discrimination. 116 It also builds on the political foundation laid by past unsuccessful reparations efforts, starting with the forty-acres-and-a-mule post- Civil War program rescinded by President Andrew Johnson and including the calls for reparations by the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. and James Forman in the 1960s and 1970s and the failed 1995 Cato class-action damages suit.1l7 At the same time, the current movement, with its supporting lawsuits, bears new rhetoric, rests partially on new claims, and **targets a far wider audience**. Generalizing broadly, the **earlier movements** tied reparations claims to the idea of equality rooted in American law and **aimed at domestic audiences** - American legislators and judges and the mainstream public. **The current movement internationalizes** African American **redress**. It does so **explicitly by asserting international human rights claims and** by **linking African American redress to reparations efforts around the world**.118 **It does so implicitly by** broadly **articulating** and staunchly pressing **internationalized** African American reparations **claims** in multiple forums **while the U**nited **S**tates **struggles for the moral high ground in its preemptive war on terror**ism**.** In short, while focusing on domestic relief to materially benefit African Americans in need, **the new face of African American reparations is globalized - not globalized as in "free trade," but globalized in terms of human rights**. This internationalization of reparations places the United States among other nations searching for peace through justice in the face of compelling, and as yet unredressed, claims of historic injustice.

US international legitimacy solves multiple scenarios for extinction

**Ikenberry 11** writes[[4]](#footnote-4)

Grand Strategy as Liberal Order Building American dominance of the global system will eventually yield to the rise of other powerful states. **The unipolar moment will pass**. In facing this circumstance, American grand strategy should be informed by answers to this question: What sort of international order would we like to see in place in 2020 or 2030 when America is less powerful? Grand strategy is a set of coordinated and sustained policies designed to address the long-term threats and opportunities that lie beyond the country’s shores. Given the great shifts in the global system and the crisis of liberal hegemonic order, how should the United States pursue grand strategy in the coming years? The answer is that **the U**nited **S**tates **should** work with others to rebuild and **renew** the **institutional foundations** of the liberal international order **and along the way re-establish its** own **authority as a global leader**. The United States is going to need to invest in alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions, special relationships, great-power concerts, cooperative security pacts, and democratic security communities. That is, the United States will need to return to the great tasks of liberal order building. It is useful to distinguish between two types of grand strategy: positional and milieu oriented. With a positional grand strategy, a great power seeks to diminish the power or threat embodied in a specific challenger state or group of states. Examples are Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, the Soviet bloc, and perhaps—in the future—Greater China. With a milieu-oriented grand strategy, a great power does not target a specific state but seeks to structure its general international environment in ways that are congenial with its long-term security. This might entail building the infrastructure of international cooperation, promoting trade and democracy in various regions of the world, and establishing partnerships that might be useful for various contingencies. My point is that under conditions of unipolarity, in a world of diffuse threats, and with pervasive uncertainty over what the specific security challenges will be in the future, this milieu-based approach to grand strategy is necessary. The United States does not face the sort of singular geopolitical threat that it did with the fascist and communist powers of the last century. Indeed, compared with the dark days of the 1930s or the Cold War, America lives in an extraordinarily benign security environment. Rather than a single overriding threat, the United States and other countries face a host of diffuse and evolving threats. Global **warming,** nuclear **prolif**eration**,** jihadist **terror**ism**, energy security**, health **pandemics**—these and other dangers loom on the horizon. Any of these threats **could endanger** Americans’ **lives** and way of life either directly or indirectly **by destabilizing the global system** upon which American security and prosperity depends. What is more, **these threats are interconnected**—**and** it is their interactive effects that represent the most acute danger. And **if** several of **these threats materialize** at the same time and interact to generate greater violence and instability, then **the global order itself**, as well as the foundations of American national security, **would be put at risk**. What unites these threats and challenges is that they are all manifestations of rising security interdependence. **More and more of what goes on in other countries matters for** the health and safety of **the U**nited **S**tates **and** the rest of **the world**. Many of the new dangers—such as health pandemics and transnational terrorist violence—stem from the weakness of states rather than their strength. At the same time, **technologies of violence are evolving**, **providing opportunities for weak states or nonstate groups to threaten others at a greater distance**. When states are in a situation of security interdependence, they cannot go it alone. They must negotiate and cooperate with other states and seek mutual restraints and protections. The United States can-not hide or protect itself from threats under conditions of rising security interdependence. It must get out in the world and work with other states to build frameworks of cooperation and leverage capacities for action against this unusually diverse, diffuse, and unpredictable array of threats and challenges. This is why a milieu-based grand strategy is attractive. The objective is to shape the international environment to maximize your capacities to protect the nation from threats. To engage in liberal order building is to invest in international cooperative frameworks—that is, rules, institutions, partnerships, networks, standby capacities, social knowledge, etc.—in which the United States operates. To build international order is to increase the global stock of “social capital”—which is the term Pierre Bourdieu, Robert Putnam, and other social scientists have used to define the actual and potential resources and capacities within a political community, manifest in and through its networks of social relations, that are available for solving collective problems. If American grand strategy is to be organized around liberal order building, what are the specific objectives and what is the policy agenda? There are five such objectives. First, the United States needs to lead in the building of an enhanced protective infrastructure that helps prevent the emergence of threats and limits the damage if they do materialize. Many of the threats mentioned above are manifest as socioeconomic backwardness and failure that cause regional and international instability and conflict. These are the sorts of threats that are likely to arise with the coming of global warming and epidemic disease. What is needed here is institutional cooperation to strengthen the capacity of governments and the international com-munity to prevent epidemics or food shortages or mass migrations that create global upheaval—and mitigate the effects of these upheavals if they occur. The international system already has a great deal of this protective infrastructure—institutions and networks that pro-mote cooperation over public health, refugees, and emergency aid. But as the scale and scope of potential problems grow in the twenty-first century, investments in these preventive and management capacities will also need to grow. Early warning systems, protocols for emergency operations, standby capacities, etc.—these safeguards are the stuff of a protective global infrastructure. Second, the United States should recommit to and rebuild its security alliances. The idea is to update the old bargains that lie behind these security pacts. In NATO, but also in the East Asia bilateral partner-ships, the United States agrees to provide security protection to the other states and brings its partners into the process of decision-making over the use of force. In return, these partners agree to work with the United States—providing manpower, logistics, and other types of support—in wider theaters of action. The United States gives up some autonomy in strategic decision-making, although it is more an informal restraint than a legally binding one, and in exchange it gets cooperation and political support. Third, the United States should reform and create encompassing global institutions that foster and legitimate collective action. The first move here should be to reform the United Nations, starting with the expansion of the permanent membership on the Security Council. Several plans have been proposed. All of them entail adding new members—such as Germany, Japan, India, Brazil, South Africa, and others—and reforming the voting procedures. Almost all of the candidates for permanent membership are mature or rising democracies. The goal, of course, is to make them stakeholders in the United Nations and thereby strengthen the primacy of the UN as a vehicle for global collective action. There really is no substitute for the legitimacy that the United Nations can offer to emergency actions—humanitarian interventions, economic sanctions, uses of force against terrorists, and so forth. Public support in advanced democracies grows rapidly when their governments can stand behind a UN-sanctioned action. Fourth, the United States should accommodate and institution-ally engage China. China will most likely be a dominant state, and the United States will need to yield to it in various ways. The United States should respond to the rise of China by strengthening the rules and institutions of the liberal international order—deepening their roots, integrating rising capitalist democracies, sharing authority and functional roles. The United States should also intensify cooperation with Europe and renew joint commitments to alliances and multilateral global governance. The more that China faces not just the United States but the entire world of capitalist democracies, the better. This is not to argue that China must face a grand counterbalancing alliance against it. Rather, it should face a complex and highly integrated global system—one that is so encompassing and deeply entrenched that it essentially has no choice but to join it and seek to prosper within it. The United States should also be seeking to construct a regional security order in East Asia that can provide a framework for managing the coming shifts. The idea is not to block China’s entry into the regional order but to help shape its terms, looking for opportunities to strike strategic bargains at various moments along the shifting power trajectories and encroaching geopolitical spheres. The big bargain that the United States will want to strike is this: to accommodate a rising China by offering it status and position within the regional order in return for Beijing’s acceptance and accommodation of Washington’s core strategic interests, which include remaining a dominant security provider within East Asia. In striking this strategic bargain, the United States will also want to try to build multilateral institutional arrangements in East Asia that will tie China to the wider region. Fifth, the United States should reclaim a liberal internationalist public philosophy. When American officials after World War II championed the building of a rule-based postwar order, they articulated a distinctive internationalist vision of order that has faded in recent decades. It was a vision that entailed a synthesis of liberal and realist ideas about economic and national security, and the sources of stable and peaceful order. These ideas—drawn from the experiences with the New Deal and the previous decades of war and depression—led American leaders to associate the national interest with the building of a managed and institutionalized global system. What is needed today is a renewed public philosophy of liberal internationalism—a shift away from neoliberal-ism—that can inform American elites as they make trade-offs between sovereignty and institutional cooperation. Under this philosophy, the restraint and the commitment of American power went hand in hand. Global rules and institutions advanced America’s national interest rather than threatened it. The alternative public philosophies that have circulated in recent years—philosophies that champion American unilateralism and disentanglement from global rules and institutions—did not meet with great success. So an opening exists for America’s postwar vision of internationalism to be updated and rearticulated today. The United States should embrace the tenets of this liberal public philosophy: Lead with rules rather than dominate with power; provide public goods and connect their provision to cooperative and accommodative policies of others; build and renew international rules and institutions that work to reinforce the capacities of states to govern and achieve security and economic success; keep the other liberal democracies close; and let the global system itself do the deep work of liberal modernization. As it navigates this brave new world, **the U**nited **S**tates **will find itself needing to share power and rely in part on others to ensure its security**. It will not be able to depend on unipolar power or airtight borders. **It will need, above all else,** authority and **respect as a** global **leader**. The United States has lost some of that authority and respect in recent years. In committing itself to a grand strategy of liberal order building, it can begin the process of gaining it back.

Outweighs on probability. Since soft power solves multiple extinction scenarios, increasing soft power is more likely to prevent extinction since any of those scenarios could be the one that does us in.

**Advantage 2** is Competitiveness

Reparations Superfund would fund alternative education projects that address black dropout rates

**Franklin 12** writes[[5]](#footnote-5)

**There is** currently an **undeniable need for a “Reparations Superfund”** to support positive and successful interventions to prevent African American youths from turning to murderous violence against other African American youths and those in the line of fire. In the past, police practices and brutality summoned youthful anger. In the 1950s it was the brutal murder of Emmitt Till in Money, Mississippi; in the 1960s it was the police—Black Panther shootouts and the assassination of Fred Hampton in Chicago. The police behavior witnessed in the Rodney King video in Los Angeles looked all-too-familiar to African American and Latino youths growing up in U.S. cities in the 1970s and 1980s. Unfortunately, youthful anger and violence has turned even more deadly for our young people since that time and they are killing each other at alarming rates. There is an urgent need to intervene to change this deadly situation. **The establishment of a Reparations Superfund would provide funding to committed professionals**, African Americans and others, who have developed strategies and models of intervention and remediation. **Successful interventions, such as “The Interrupters” project in Chicago** profiled in a PBS Frontline documentary, **would be** supported and **replicated** in neighborhoods **across the country**.1 The Reparations Superfund would operate like the $20 billion (tax deductible) BP Oil Spill Superfund and would pay out to those groups mounting proven interventions and to those organizations and individuals with the skills, training, and willingness to be held accountable for their work with our young people. We must recognize that poverty is no longer the prime target for the funding of these interventions; it has become a matter of life and death, and African American youths and other young people of color must be the prime targets for programs supported by the Reparations Superfund. **The Reparations Superfund would** be used to **fund projects in public schools to promote** the **arts and music and** in private institutions offering **supplemental education in** the form of **music and arts programs** such as the Harmony Program 2 The Journal of African American History in New York City, the Roots of Music Program in New Orleans, or other community arts programs aimed at young adults. And our children will love us all the more because we are using reparations funds to support them. Clyde Robertson’s important Essay Review “Blueprints for the Development of African American Youth” in this Journal of African American History Special Issue highlights programs that could be implemented and replicated in African American communities nationwide, and thus should be eligible for funding from the Reparations Superfund.2 **The Reparations Superfund would** be used to target and **support alternatives to** the current emphasis on **“high stakes testing” and test prep**aration **that contributes** mightily **to** the **high dropout rates among African American** and other **children** of color. The **educational entrepreneurs**, examined in Diane Ravitch’s The Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and Choice Are Undermining Education, were trained by the members of “Billionaire Boys Club” and sought to profit from the state and federal funds flowing into public school districts; and many targeted children of color for these latest business ventures.3 The continuing problem is that while educational entrepreneurs are profiting from the “charter school revolution,” the dropout rates remain high for children of color. Dropping out becomes a crucial issue in the secondary years, but most of the charter schools are limited to the elementary grades where the educational expenses are lower than for middle and high schools. The goal should be the creation of educational environments at the middle and high school levels where our children want to be and where they will flourish socially and academically. With the academic achievements of “magnet schools” as the models, the Reparations Superfund would allow school districts to apply for financial support to implement creative and successful performing arts, science and technology, health careers, community service, or other innovative alternative educational programs and projects aimed at dropout prevention and increasing personal engagement and the motivation among young people to remain in school.4 The Reparations Superfund would help to support maternal and early childhood health care programs and interventions that target young children and place them in a “health-care network” administered by health care professionals who have experience implementing these programs successfully in African American communities or neighborhoods. **Scholarships and “bridge programs” developed by** the **historically black colleges** and universities to attract potential high school dropouts to enroll in institutions of higher education **would be targeted for support from the Reparations Superfund**. Health and recreational programs for children and young adults tied to libraries, museums, community centers, and other African American cultural institutions have been developed by African American professionals and others who have become the leading experts on effecFrom Ex-Slave Pensions to the Reparations Superfund 3 tive interventions and they would be consulted before making any Superfund financial disbursements. Unlike the BP Superfund, however, the **claimants would not have to bring specific evidence of** the **damage done** to African American and other children of color **by** the operations of **multinational corporate capitalists who prey upon the poor and working class** through pay-day loans, car title loans, sub-prime mortgages and other “products” seeking to shift the meager funds that the workers possess into the bank accounts of wealthy financiers and their clients in “Poverty Inc.” Gary Rivlin’s Broke, USA, Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson’s Winner-Take-All Politics, and other investigations have revealed how African Americans and other minority groups are targeted for financial transactions that enriched “the one percent.” The Reparations Superfund would be used to support programs to protect African American children and young people from the most damaging effects of an economic and social system that profits from man-made and natural disasters.5 Thus far in this introduction I have identified the specific goals for the Reparations Superfund, and before addressing who should pay, I must engage the historians’ “why” question: Why should the people living in the 21st century who consider themselves “African Americans” be entitled collectively to reparations payments? The answer can be found in the articles and books highlighted in this Special Issue of The Journal of African American History.

High dropouts among young black people kill US economic competitiveness

**Dillon 9** writes[[6]](#footnote-6)

On any given day, about one in every 10 young male high school dropouts is in jail or juvenile detention, compared with one in 35 young male high school graduates, according to a new study of the effects of dropping out of school in an America where demand for low-skill workers is plunging. The picture is even bleaker for African-Americans, with nearly one in four young black male dropouts incarcerated or otherwise institutionalized on an average day, the study said. That compares with about one in 14 young, male, white, Asian or Hispanic dropouts. **Researchers at Northeastern** University **used** census and other **government data to carry out the study, which tracks** the employment, workplace, parenting and criminal justice **experiences of young high school dropouts**. “We’re trying to show what it means to be a dropout in the 21st century United States,” said Andrew Sum, director of the Center for Labor Market Studies at Northeastern, who headed a team of researchers that prepared the report. “It’s one of the country’s costliest problems. The unemployment, the incarceration rates — it’s scary.” A coalition of **civil rights** and public education advocacy **groups and** a network of **alternative schools in Chicago commissioned the report** as part of a push for new educational opportunities for the nation’s 6.2 million high school dropouts. “**The dropout rate is driving the nation’s** increasing **prison population, and it’s a drag on America’s economic competitiveness**,” said Marc H. Morial, the former New Orleans mayor who is president of the National Urban League, one of the groups in the coalition that commissioned the report. “**This report makes** it **clear that every American pays a cost when a young person leaves school without a diploma**.” **The report puts the collective cost** to the nation over the working life of each high school dropout **at $292,000**. Mr. Sum said that figure took into account lost tax revenues, since dropouts earn less and therefore pay less in taxes than high school graduates. It also includes the costs of providing food stamps and other aid to dropouts and of incarcerating those who turn to crime. Daniel J. Losen, a senior associate at the Civil Rights Project at the University of California, Los Angeles, said the study was consistent with other economic studies of the dropout crisis, though he said the methodology of its cost-benefit analysis “lacked transparency.” “The report’s strength is that it reveals in clear terms that there’s a real crisis with the high numbers of young, especially minority males, who drop out of school and wind up incarcerated,” Mr. Losen said. **Previous studies have come up with estimates of the same order of magnitude** on the social cost of low graduation rates. A 2007 study by Teachers College, Princeton and City University of New York researchers, for instance, estimated that society could save $209,000 in prison and other costs for every potential dropout who could be helped to complete high school. The new report, in its analysis of 2008 unemployment rates, found that 54 percent of dropouts ages 16 to 24 were jobless, compared with 32 percent for high school graduates of the same age, and 13 percent for those with a college degree. Again, the statistics were worse for young African-American dropouts, whose unemployment rate last year was 69 percent, compared with 54 percent for whites and 47 percent for Hispanics. The unemployment rate among young Hispanics was lower, the report said, because included in that category were many illegal immigrants, who compete successfully for jobs with native-born youths. The unemployment rates cited for all groups have climbed several points in 2009 because of the recession, Mr. Sum said. Young female dropouts were nine times more likely to have become single mothers than young women who went on to earn college degrees, the report said, citing census data for 2006 and 2007. The number of unmarried young women having children has increased sharply in some communities in part, Mr. Sum said, because large numbers of young men have dropped out of school and are jobless year round. As a result, young women do not view them as having the wherewithal to support a family. “None of these guys can afford to own a home, they just don’t have any money,” he said. “And as a result, any time they father a child it’s out of wedlock. It wasn’t like this 30 years ago.” He cited his hometown, Gary, Ind., as an example. “Back in the 1970s, my friends in Gary would quit school in senior year and go to work at U.S. Steel and make a good living, and young guys in Michigan would go to work in an auto plant,” he said. “You just can’t do that anymore. Today, you have a lot of dropouts who are jobless year round.”

Prefer my evidence:
a. It’s consistent with other studies of black dropouts that conclude each one costs a significant amount to the US

b. It accounts for the likelihood dropouts will go to prison—they can’t contribute to the US’s economic standing while in jail

Empirics prove that competitiveness creates economic hegemony which solves global conflict. **Hubbard 10** writes[[7]](#footnote-7)

Research into the theoretical underpinnings of this topic revealed that there are two main subfields within the literature on hegemonic stability. One line of study, an avenue pursued by prominent theorists such as Kindleberger, Keohane, and Ikenberry focuses primarily on questions of related to the economic system. The other avenue, pursued by theorists such as Gilpin, looks at the role of hegemonic governance in reducing violent conflict. In my research, I focus on this aspect of hegemonic stability – its implications for military conflict in the international system. To research this question, I undertook a broad quantitative study that examined data from both the American and British hegemonic epochs, focusing on the years of 1815-1939 in the case of British hegemony, and 1945 to 1999 in the case of American hegemony. I hypothesized that hegemonic strength was inversely correlated with levels of armed conflict in the international system. Using the data from the Correlates of War Project, I was able to perform a number of statistical analyses on my hypothesis. To measure hegemonic strength, I used the Composite Index of National Capability, a metric that averages together six different dimensions of relative power as a share of total power in the international system. **I** then **matched this data with data cataloging all conflicts** in the international system **since 1815**. I organized this data into five-year increments, in order to make statistical analysis more feasible. **Regression** analysis of the data **revealed** that there was **a statistically significant negative correlation between** relative **heg**emonic power **and conflict** levels in the international system. However, further statistical tests added complications to the picture of hegemonic governance that was emerging. Regression analysis of military actions engaged in by the hegemon versus total conflict in the system revealed a highly positive correlation for both American and British hegemony. Further **analysis revealed** that in both cases, **military power was a less accurate predictor of** military **conflict than economic power**. There are several possible explanations for these findings. It is likely that economic stability has an effect on international security. In addition, **weaker hegemons are more likely to be challenged militarily** than stronger hegemons. Thus, the hegemon will engage in more conflicts during times of international insecurity, because such times are also when the hegemon is weakest. Perhaps the **most important** implication of this research **is that hegemons may well be more effective in promoting peace through economic power** than through the exercise of military force. II. Research Question In examining hegemonic stability theory, there are several important questions to consider. First of all, an acceptable definition of what constitutes a hegemon must be established. Secondly, a good measure of what constitutes stability in the international system must be determined. Certainly, the frequency and severity of interstate conflict is an important measure of stability in the international system. However, other measures of stability should also be taken into account. Conflict in the international system takes on a wide range of forms. While military conflict is perhaps the most violent and severe dimension, it is only one of many forms that conflict can take. Conflict need not be confined to wars between traditional states. Terrorism, piracy, and guerilla warfare are also types of conflict that are endemic to the international system. Economic conflict, exemplified by trade wars, hostile actions such as sanctions, or outright trade embargos, is also an important form of conflict in the international system. States can also engage in a range of less severe actions that might be deemed political conflict, by recalling an ambassador or withdrawing from international bodies, for example. Clearly, “stability” as it pertains to the international system is a vast and amorphous concept. Because of these complexities, a comprehensive assessment of the theory is beyond the purview of this research. However, completing a more focused analysis is a realistic endeavor. Focusing on international armed conflicts in two select periods will serve to increase the feasibility the research. I will focus on the period of British hegemony lasting from the end of the Napoleonic wars to 1939 and the period of American hegemony beginning after the Second World War and continuing until 1999, the last year for which reliable data is available. The proposed hypothesis is that in these periods, the **heg**emon **acted as a stabilizing force** by reducing the frequency and severity of international armed conflict. The dependent variable in this case is the frequency and severity of conflict. The primary independent variable is the power level of the hegemon. This hypothesis is probabilistic since it posits that the hegemon tended to reduce conflict, not that it did so in every single possible instance. One way to test this hypothesis would be through a case-study method that examined the role of Britain and the United States in several different conflicts. This method would have the advantage of approaching the problem from a very feasible, limited perspective. While it would not reveal much about hegemony on a broader theoretical level, it would help provide practical grounding for what is a highly theoretical area of stuffy in international relations. Another method would be to do a broader quantitative comparison of international conflict by finding and comparing data on conflict and hegemonic strength for the entire time covered by British and American hegemony. The hypothesis is falsifiable, because it could be shown that the hegemon did not act as a stabilizing force during the years of study. **It** also **avoids** some of **the pitfalls** associated **with the case study method, such as selection bias and** the inherently **subjective** nature of **qualitative analysis.**

Prefer my evidence:
a. Historical context – it’s consistent with data from conflicts since 1815 – consistent pattern makes it more likely not just correlation

b. Outweighs the hard power disad since economic heg is more likely to ensure peace

c. My author explicitly avoids selection bias and other subjective qualitative biases

d. Means I solve the root cause of every neg nuclear war scenario – econ heg solves global conflict before it can escalate

Adopt a parliamentary model to account for moral uncertainty. This entails minimizing existential risks. **Bostrom 9** writes[[8]](#footnote-8)

It seems people are overconfident about their moral beliefs.  But **how should one** reason and **act if one** acknowledges that one **is uncertain about morality** – not just applied ethics but fundamental moral issues? if you don't know which moral theory is correct?

It doesn't seem **you can[’t] simply plug your uncertainty into expected utility** decision theory and crank the wheel; **because many** moral **theories** state that you **should not** always **maximize** expected **utility.**

Even if we limit consideration to consequentialist theories, it still is hard to see how to combine them in the standard decision theoretic framework.  For example, suppose you give X% probability to total utilitarianism and (100-X)% to average utilitarianism.  Now an action might add 5 utils to total happiness and decrease average happiness by 2 utils.  (This could happen, e.g. if you create a new happy person that is less happy than the people who already existed.)  Now what do you do, for different values of X?

The problem gets even more complicated if we consider not only consequentialist theories but also deontological theories, contractarian theories, virtue ethics, etc.  We might even throw various meta-ethical theories into the stew: error theory, relativism, etc.

I'm working on a paper on this together with my colleague Toby Ord.  We have some arguments against a few possible "solutions" that we think don't work.  On the positive side we have some tricks that work for a few special cases.  But beyond that, the best **we have managed** so far is **a** kind of **metaphor, which** we don't think is literally and exactly correct, and it is a bit under-determined, but it **seems to get things roughly right** and it might point in the right direction:

**The Parliamentary Model.**  Suppose that you have a set of mutually exclusive moral theories, and that you assign each of these some probability.  Now imagine that **each** of these **theorie**s **gets to send** some number of **delegates to The Parliament**.  The number of delegates each theory gets to send is **proportional to the probability of the theory.**  Then the delegates bargain with one another for support on various issues; and the Parliament reaches a decision by the delegates voting.  What you should do is act according to the decisions of this imaginary Parliament.  (Actually, we use an extra trick here: we imagine that the delegates act as if the Parliament's decision were a stochastic variable such that the probability of the Parliament taking action A is proportional to the fraction of votes for A.  This has the effect of eliminating the artificial 50% threshold that otherwise gives a majority bloc absolute power.  Yet – unbeknownst to the delegates – the Parliament always takes whatever action got the most votes: this way we avoid paying the cost of the randomization!)

The idea here is that moral theories get more influence the more probable they are; yet **even a** relatively **weak theory can still get its way on some issues** that the theory think are extremely important **by sacrificing** its influence **on other** i**s**sues that other theories deem more important.  For example, **suppose you assign 10% probability to** total **util**itarianism and 90% to moral egoism (just to illustrate the principle).  Then **the Parliament** would mostly take actions that maximize egoistic satisfaction; however it **would make some concessions to util**itarianism **on** issues that utilitarianism thinks is especially important.  In this example, the person might donate some portion of their income to **existential risks** research and otherwise live completely selfishly.

I think there might be wisdom in **this model**.  It **avoids the** dangerous and **unstable extremism** that would result **from letting one’s current favorite moral theory completely dictate action**, while still allowing the aggressive pursuit of some non-commonsensical high-leverage strategies so long as they don’t infringe too much on what other major moral theories deem centrally important.

I don’t need to win that weighing values is possible. Extinction precludes all values, so it is wrong under any moral code. **Seeley 86**[[9]](#footnote-9)

In moral reasoning prediction of consequences is nearly always impossible. One balances the risks of an action against its benefits; one also considers what known damage the action would do. Thus a surgeon in deciding whether to perform an operation weighs the known effects (the loss of some nerve function, for example) and risks (death) against the benefits, and weighs also the risks and benefits of not performing surgery. Morally, however, **human extinction is unlike any other risk. No conceivable human good could be worth** the **extinction** of the race, **for** in order **to be a human good it must be experienced by human beings.** Thus extinction is one result we dare not-may not-risk. Though not conclusively established, **the risk of extinction is real enough to make nuclear war** utterly **impermissible under any** sane **moral code.**

The standard is **maximizing happiness**.

Brain studies prove personal identity doesn’t exist. **Parfit 84** writes[[10]](#footnote-10)

Some **recent medical cases provide striking evidence in favour of the Reductionist View.** Human beings have a **lower brain and** two **upper hemispheres**, which **are connected by a bundle of fibres.** In treating a few people with severe epilepsy, **surgeons have cut these fibres.** The aim was to reduce the severity of epileptic fits, by confining their causes to a single hemisphere. This aim was achieved. But the operations had another unintended consequence. **The effect**, in the words of one surgeon, **was the creation of ‘two separate spheres of consciousness.’ This effect was revealed by** various **psychological tests.** These made use of two facts. We control our right arms with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. And what is in the right halves of our visual fields we see with our left hemispheres, and vice versa. When someone’s hemispheres have been disconnected, **psychologists can thus present** to this person two different written **questions in the two halves of his visual field, and can receive two different answers** written by this person’s two hands.

In the absence of personal identity, only end states can matter. **Shoemaker 99**[[11]](#footnote-11)

Extreme reductionism might lend support to utilitarianism in the following way. Many people claim that we are justified in maximizing the good in our own lives, but not justified in maximizing the good across sets of lives, simply because each of us is a single, deeply unified person, unified by the further fact of identity, whereas there is no such corresponding unity across sets of lives. But if the only justification for the different treatment of individual lives and sets of lives is the further fact, and this fact is undermined by the truth of reductionism, then nothing justifies this different treatment. **There are no deeply unified subjects of experience. What remains are merely the experiences themselves, and so any ethical theory distinguishing between individual lives** and sets of lives **is mistaken.** If the deep, further fact is missing, then there are no unities. **The morally significant units should then be the states people are in at particular times, and an ethical theory that focused on them** and attempted to improve their quality, whatever their location, **would be the most plausible. Util**itarianism **is just such a theory.**

Second, revisionary intuitionism

Revisionary intuitionism is true and leads to util.

**Yudkowsky 8** writes[[12]](#footnote-12)

I haven't said much about metaethics - the nature of morality - because that has a forward dependency on a discussion of the Mind Projection Fallacy that I haven't gotten to yet. I used to be very confused about metaethics. After my confusion finally cleared up, I did a postmortem on my previous thoughts. I found that my object-level moral reasoning had been valuable and my **meta-level moral reasoning had been worse than useless.** And this appears to be a general syndrome - **people do much better when discussing whether torture is** good or **bad than when they discuss the meaning of "good" and "bad". Thus, I deem it prudent to keep moral discussions on the object level** wherever I possibly can. Occasionally **people object** to any discussion of morality on the grounds **that morality doesn't exist**, and in lieu of jumping over the forward dependency to explain that **"exist" is not the right term to use** here, I generally say, "But **what do you do anyway?**" and **take the discussion back down to the object level.** Paul Gowder, though, has pointed out that both the idea of choosing a googolplex dust specks in a googolplex eyes over 50 years of torture for one person, and the idea of "utilitarianism", depend on "intuition". He says I've argued that the two are not compatible, but charges me with failing to argue for the utilitarian intuitions that I appeal to. Now "intuition" is not how I would describe the computations that underlie human morality and distinguish us, as moralists, from an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness and/or a rock. But I am okay with using the word "intuition" as a term of art, bearing in mind that "intuition" in this sense is not to be contrasted to reason, but is, rather, the cognitive building block out of which both long verbal arguments and fast perceptual arguments are constructed. **I see** the project of **morality as a project of renormalizing intuition.** We have intuitions about things that seem desirable or undesirable, intuitions about actions that are right or wrong, intuitions about how to resolve conflicting intuitions, intuitions about how to systematize specific intuitions into general principles. **Delete all** the **intuitions, and** you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect emptiness, **you're left with a rock. Keep all your** specific **intuitions and** refuse to build upon the reflective ones, and you aren't left with an ideal philosopher of perfect spontaneity and genuineness, **you're left with a** grunting **caveperson** running in circles, due to cyclical preferences and similar inconsistencies. "Intuition", as a term of art, is not a curse word when it comes to morality - there is nothing else to argue from. **Even modus ponens is an "intuition"** in this sense - **it**'s **just** that modus ponens **still seems like a good idea after being** formalized, **reflected on**, extrapolated out to see if it has sensible consequences, etcetera. So that is "intuition". However, Gowder did not say what he meant by "utilitarianism". Does utilitarianism say... That right actions are strictly determined by good consequences? That praiseworthy actions depend on justifiable expectations of good consequences? That probabilities of consequences should normatively be discounted by their probability, so that a 50% probability of something bad should weigh exactly half as much in our tradeoffs? That virtuous actions always correspond to maximizing expected utility under some utility function? That two harmful events are worse than one? That two independent occurrences of a harm (not to the same person, not interacting with each other) are exactly twice as bad as one? That for any two harms A and B, with A much worse than B, there exists some tiny probability such that gambling on this probability of A is preferable to a certainty of B? If you say that I advocate something, or that my argument depends on something, and that it is wrong, do please specify what this thingy is... anyway, I accept 3, 5, 6, and 7, but not 4; I am not sure about the phrasing of 1; and 2 is true, I guess, but phrased in a rather solipsistic and selfish fashion: you should not worry about being praiseworthy. Now, what are the "intuitions" upon which my "utilitarianism" depends? This is a deepish sort of topic, but I'll take a quick stab at it. First of all, it's not just that someone presented me with a list of statements like those above, and I decided which ones sounded "intuitive". Among other things, **if you try to violate** "**util**itarianism", **you run into paradoxes, contradictions**, circular preferences, **and other** things that aren't **symptoms of** moral wrongness so much as **moral incoherence.** After you think about moral problems for a while, and also find new truths about the world, and even discover disturbing facts about how you yourself work, you often end up with different moral opinions than when you started out. This does not quite define moral progress, but it is how we experience moral progress. As part of my experienced moral progress, I've drawn a conceptual separation between questions of type Where should we go? and questions of type How should we get there? (Could that be what Gowder means by saying I'm "utilitarian"?) The question of where a road goes - where it leads - you can answer by traveling the road and finding out. If you have a false belief about where the road leads, this falsity can be destroyed by the truth in a very direct and straightforward manner. When it comes to wanting to go to a particular place, this want is not entirely immune from the destructive powers of truth. You could go there and find that you regret it afterward (which does not define moral error, but is how we experience moral error). But, even so, wanting to be in a particular place seems worth distinguishing from wanting to take a particular road to a particular place. Our intuitions about where to go are arguable enough, but our intuitions about how to get there are frankly messed up. **After** the two hundred and eighty-seventh **research** study **showing that people will chop their own feet off if you frame the problem the wrong way, you start to distrust first impressions. When you've read enough research on scope insensitivity** - people will pay only 28% more to protect all 57 wilderness areas in Ontario than one area, **people will pay the same amount to save 50,000 lives as 5,000 lives**... that sort of thing... Well, the worst case of scope insensitivity I've ever heard of was described here by Slovic: Other recent research shows similar results. Two Israeli psychologists asked people to contribute to a costly life-saving treatment. They could offer that contribution to a group of eight sick children, or to an individual child selected from the group. The target amount needed to save the child (or children) was the same in both cases. Contributions to individual group members far outweighed the contributions to the entire group. There's other research along similar lines, but I'm just presenting one example, 'cause, y'know, eight examples would probably have less impact. If you know the general experimental paradigm, then the reason for the above behavior is pretty obvious - focusing your attention on a single child creates more emotional arousal than trying to distribute attention around eight children simultaneously. So people are willing to pay more to help one child than to help eight. Now, **you could** look at this intuition, and **think it was** revealing **some** kind of **incredibly deep moral truth** which shows that one child's good fortune is somehow devalued by the other children's good fortune. But what about the billions of other children in the world? Why isn't it a bad idea to help this one child, when that causes the value of all the other children to go down? How can it be significantly better to have 1,329,342,410 happy children than 1,329,342,409, but then somewhat worse to have seven more at 1,329,342,417? **Or you could** look at that and **say: "The intuition is wrong: the brain can't** successfully **multiply** by eight and get a larger quantity than it started with. **But it ought to**, normatively speaking." And once you realize that the brain can't multiply by eight, then the other cases of scope neglect stop seeming to reveal some fundamental truth about 50,000 lives being worth just the same effort as 5,000 lives, or whatever. You don't get the impression you're looking at the revelation of a deep moral truth about nonagglomerative utilities. It's just that the brain doesn't goddamn multiply. Quantities get thrown out the window. If you have $100 to spend, and you spend $20 each on each of 5 efforts to save 5,000 lives, you will do worse than if you spend $100 on a single effort to save 50,000 lives. Likewise if such choices are made by 10 different people, rather than the same person. As soon as you start believing that it is better to save 50,000 lives than 25,000 lives, that simple preference of final destinations has implications for the choice of paths, when you consider five different events that save 5,000 lives. (It is a general principle that Bayesians see no difference between the long-run answer and the short-run answer; you never get two different answers from computing the same question two different ways. But the long run is a helpful intuition pump, so I am talking about it anyway.) The aggregative valuation strategy of "shut up and multiply" arises from the simple preference to have more of something - to save as many lives as possible - when you have to describe general principles for choosing more than once, acting more than once, planning at more than one time. Aggregation also arises from claiming that the local choice to save one life doesn't depend on how many lives already exist, far away on the other side of the planet, or far away on the other side of the universe. Three lives are one and one and one. No matter how many billions are doing better, or doing worse. 3 = 1 + 1 + 1, no matter what other quantities you add to both sides of the equation. And if you add another life you get 4 = 1 + 1 + 1 + 1. That's aggregation. **When you've read enough** heuristics and **biases research, and enough coherence** and uniqueness **proofs for** Bayesian probabilities and **expected utility**, and you've seen the "Dutch book" and "money pump" effects that penalize trying to handle uncertain outcomes any other way, **then you don't see** the **preference reversals** in the Allais Paradox **as** revealing **some** incredibly **deep moral truth** about the intrinsic value of certainty. **It just goes to show that the brain doesn't** goddamn **multiply.** The primitive, perceptual intuitions that make a choice "feel good" don't handle probabilistic pathways through time very skillfully, especially when the probabilities have been expressed symbolically rather than experienced as a frequency. So you reflect, devise more trustworthy logics, and think it through in words. When you see people insisting that no amount of money whatsoever is worth a single human life, and then driving an extra mile to save $10; or when you see people insisting that no amount of money is worth a decrement of health, and then choosing the cheapest health insurance available; then you don't think that their protestations reveal some deep truth about incommensurable utilities. Part of it, clearly, is that **primitive intuitions don't successfully diminish the emotional impact of** symbols standing for **small quantities** - anything you talk about seems like "an amount worth considering". And part of it has to do with preferring unconditional social rules to conditional social rules. Conditional rules seem weaker, seem more subject to manipulation. If there's any loophole that lets the government legally commit torture, then the government will drive a truck through that loophole. So it seems like there should be an unconditional social injunction against preferring money to life, and no "but" following it. Not even "but a thousand dollars isn't worth a 0.0000000001% probability of saving a life". Though the latter choice, of course, is revealed every time we sneeze without calling a doctor. The rhetoric of sacredness gets bonus points for seeming to express an unlimited commitment, an unconditional refusal that signals trustworthiness and refusal to compromise. So you conclude that moral rhetoric espouses qualitative distinctions, because espousing a quantitative tradeoff would sound like you were plotting to defect. On such occasions, people vigorously want to throw quantities out the window, and they get upset if you try to bring quantities back in, because quantities sound like conditions that would weaken the rule. But you don't conclude that there are actually two tiers of utility with lexical ordering. You don't conclude that there is actually an infinitely sharp moral gradient, some atom that moves a Planck distance (in our continuous physical universe) and sends a utility from 0 to infinity. You don't conclude that utilities must be expressed using hyper-real numbers. Because the lower tier would simply vanish in any equation. It would never be worth the tiniest effort to recalculate for it. All decisions would be determined by the upper tier, and all thought spent thinking about the upper tier only, if the upper tier genuinely had lexical priority. As Peter Norvig once pointed out, if Asimov's robots had strict priority for the First Law of Robotics ("A robot shall not harm a human being, nor through inaction allow a human being to come to harm") then no robot's behavior would ever show any sign of the other two Laws; there would always be some tiny First Law factor that would be sufficient to determine the decision. Whatever value is worth thinking about at all, must be worth trading off against all other values worth thinking about, because thought itself is a limited resource that must be traded off. When you reveal a value, you reveal a utility. I don't say that morality should always be simple. I've already said that the meaning of music is more than happiness alone, more than just a pleasure center lighting up. I would rather see music composed by people than by nonsentient machine learning algorithms, so that someone should have the joy of composition; I care about the journey, as well as the destination. And I am ready to hear if you tell me that the value of music is deeper, and involves more complications, than I realize - that the valuation of this one event is more complex than I know. But that's for one event. When it comes to multiplying by quantities and probabilities, complication is to be avoided - at least if you care more about the destination than the journey. **When you've reflected** on enough intuitions, **and corrected enough absurdities, you** start to **see a common denominator, a meta-principle** at work, **which one might phrase as "Shut up and multiply."** Where music is concerned, I care about the journey. When lives are at stake, I shut up and multiply. It is more important that lives be saved, than that we conform to any particular ritual in saving them. And the optimal path to that destination is governed by laws that are simple, because they are math. **And that's why I'm a utilitarian** - at least when I am doing something that is overwhelmingly more important than my own feelings about it - which is most of the time, because there are not many utilitarians, and many things left undone.

Prefer my evidence

a. Solves normal disads to intuitionism – revisionary intuitionism doesn’t commit the is-ought fallacy since we’d change our intuitions if they’re cognitively biased, which also solves the objection that intuitions are relative

b. Filters out supposedly intuitive objections to util – err aff because those intuitions are cognitively biased

Third, act-omission distinction doesn’t apply to states.

**Sunstein and Vermuele 5** write[[13]](#footnote-13)

The most fundamental point is that unlike individuals, **governments always** and necessarily **face a choice between** or among **possible policies for regulating third parties. The distinction between acts and omissions may not be intelligible in this context,** and even if it is, the distinction does not make a morally relevant difference. Most generally, government is in the business of creating permissions and prohibitions. When it explicitly or implicitly authorizes private action, it is not omitting to do anything or refusing to act. **Moreover, the distinction between authorized and unauthorized private action** – for example, private killing – **becomes obscure when government** formally **forbids private action but chooses a** set of **policy** instruments **that do[es] not** adequately or **fully discourage it.**

3 impacts

a. Deon fails because a government is morally responsible for inaction in conflict scenarios

b. Means that skep, permissibility and presumption are substantively irrelevant because the government always has to take an action

c. If the neg wins a non-utilitarian framework, this means extinction scenarios link since their standard now requires maximizing whatever good they specify

And fourth, morality must take the form of a universal rule. **Singer 9** writes[[14]](#footnote-14)

**When I prescribe something**, using moral language, **my prescription commits me to a** substantive **moral judgment about all** relevantly **similar cases. This includes hypothetical cases in which I am in a different position from my actual one. So to make a moral judgment, I must put myself** in the position of the other person affected by my proposed action – or to be more precise, **in the position of *all* those affected** by my action. Whether I can accept the judgment – that is, whether I can prescribe it universally – will then depend on whether I could accept it if I had to live the lives of all those affected by the action.

Universalizability justifies util. **Singer 93**[[15]](#footnote-15)

The universal aspect of ethics, I suggest, does provide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly utilitarian position. My reason for suggesting this is as follows. **In accepting that ethical judgments must be** made from a **universal** point of view, **I am accepting that my own interests cannot,** simply because they are my interests, **count more than the interests of anyone else. Thus my** very natural **concern that my own interests be looked after must**, when I think ethically, **be extended to** the interests of **others.** Now, imagine that I am trying to decide between two possible courses of action – perhaps whether to eat all the fruits I have collected myself, or to share them with others. Imagine, too, that I am deciding in a complete ethical vacuum, that I know nothing of any ethical considerations – I am, we might say, in a pre-ethical stage of thinking. How would I make up my mind? One thing that would be still relevant would be how the possible courses of action will affect my interests. Indeed, if we define ‘interests’ broadly enough, so that we count anything people desire as in their interests (unless it is incompatible with another desire or desires), then it would seem that at this pre-ethical stage, only one’s own interests can be relevant to the decision. Suppose I then begin to think ethically, to the extent of recognizing that my own interests cannot count for more, simply because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place of my own interests, I now have to take into account the interests of all those affected by my decision. **This requires me to weigh** up **all** these **interests and** adopt the course of action most likely to **maximize the interests of those affected.**

Neg burden is to defend a competitive post-fiat policy. Offense-defense is key to fairness and real world education. This means ignore skepticism, permissibility, presumption, and pre-fiat kritiks.

**Nelson 8** writes[[16]](#footnote-16)

And **the truth-statement model** of the resolution **imposes an absolute burden of proof on the aff**irmative: if the resolution is a truth-claim, and the afﬁrmative has the burden of proving that claim, in so far as intuitively we tend to disbelieve truthclaims until we are persuaded otherwise, the afﬁrmative has the burden to prove that statement absolutely true. Indeed, one of the most common theory arguments in LD is conditionality, which argues it is inappropriate for the afﬁrmative to claim only proving the truth of part of the resolution is sufﬁcient to earn the ballot. Such a model of the resolution also gives the negative access to a range of strategies that many students, coaches, and judges ﬁnd ridiculous or even irrelevant to evaluation of the resolution.

If the **neg**ative **need only** prevent the affirmative from proving the truth of the resolution, it is logically sufficient to negate to **deny our ability to make truth-statements or** to **prove** normative **morality does not exist** or to deny the reliability of human senses or reason. Yet, even though most coaches appear to endorse the truth-statement model of the resolution, they complain about the use of such negative strategies, even though they are a necessary consequence of that model. And, moreover, **such strategies** seem fundamentally unfair, as they **provide the neg**ative **with functionally inﬁnite ground**, as there are a nearly inﬁnite variety of such skeptical objections to normative claims, while continuing to bind the afﬁrmative to a much smaller range of options: advocacy of the resolution as a whole.

Instead, it seems much more reasonable to treat the resolution as a way to equitably divide ground: the affirmative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to the value judgment implied by the resolution and the negative advocating the desirability of a world in which people adhere to a value judgment mutually exclusive to that implied by the resolution. By making the issue one of desirability of **[Under] competing world-views** rather than of truth, the affirmative gains access to increased flexibility regarding how he or she chooses to defend that world, while the **neg**ative **retains equal flexibility while being denied** access to those **skeptical arguments** indicted above. Our ability to make normative claims is irrelevant to a discussion of the desirability of making two such claims. Unless there is some significant harm in making such statements, some offensive reason to reject making them that can be avoided by an advocacy mutually exclusive with that of the affirmative such objections are not a reason the negative world is more desirable, and therefore not a reason to negate. Note this is precisely how things have been done in policy debate for some time: a team that runs a kritik is expected to offer some impact of the mindset they are indicting and some alternative that would solve for that impact. A team that simply argued some universal, unavoidable, problem was bad and therefore a reason to negate would not be very successful. It is about time LD started treating such arguments the same way.

**Such a model** of the resolution has additional benefits as well. First, it **forces both debaters to offer offensive reasons to prefer** their worldview, thereby further **enforcing a parallel burden structure.** This means debaters can no longer get away with arguing the resolution is by definition true of false. The “truth” of the particular vocabulary of the resolution is irrelevant to its desirability. **Second, it is intuitive. When people evaluate** the truth of **ethical claims, they consider their implications in the real world.** They ask themselves whether a world in which people live by that ethical rule is better than one in which they don’t. Such debates don’t happen solely in the abstract. We want to know how the various options affect us and the world we live in.

Prefer aff interpretations. Key to clash. **O’Donnell 4** writes[[17]](#footnote-17)

**AFC preserves the value of the first aff**irmative constructive **speech. This speech is the starting point for the debate.** It is a function of necessity. The debate must begin somewhere if it is to begin at all. **Failure to grant AFC** is a denial of the service rendered by the affirmative team’s labor when they crafted this speech. Further, if the affirmative does not get to pick the starting point, **[renders] the opening speech** act is essentially rendered **meaningless while the rest of the debate becomes a debate about what we should be debating about.**

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